More musings on Tibet propaganda drive

It’s still going to be a few days yet before it feels acceptable to write about anything non-Tibet related. I was mulling over the possibility of tackling the reemergence of “thought liberation”, touched upon by the Economist, bellowed from the rooftops by Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang and planted in question format by a Xinhua journalist at Wen Jiabao’s parliamentary press conference this week. I’ll put it on ice for now, particularly as this idea of “emancipation of the mind” is hardly reflected in China’s propaganda strategies on Tibet: namely to “incite patriotism and hatred of the Dalai Lama clique” among the Chinese people, according to the Ministry of Publicity’s internal directive.

With Tibet hoovering up the column inches, Tuesday’s predictably farcical trial of human rights campaigner Hu Jia received limited coverage, understandable given most China correspondents were playing hide-and-seek with police in Tibetan areas of Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai. No verdict was given at the end of a trial that lasted a few hours, the typically brief period of time allowed for a defendant on “inciting state subversion” charges. Strange really, seeing as the government could have regarded the issuance of a prison sentence as one of those good-days-to-bury-bad-news moments. Could that mean the government is waiting for the Tibet furore to die down before showing Hu Jia leniency in a spectacular, although painfully unsubtle, pre-Olympic PR stunt? Hu’s lawyer doesn’t seem to think so, according to the Reporters Without Borders press release:

One of his lawyers, Li Fangping, was pessimistic when he left the court at the end of the hearing, saying his client faced the possibility of a five-year prison sentence.

On a personal note, it has been a different week. I have done very unexpected interviews with four different BBC radio channels and NPR, discussing China’s propaganda tactics on the Tibet issue in my capacity, I presume, as a blogging ex-propagandist. In between these, I was working on an article on the short-term effectiveness of China’s propaganda on the domestic front which involved speaking to people much more qualified than myself to speak on national radio. I was going to post in detail about it but Will “Imagethief” Moss, clearly juggling recent fatherhood and analytical thought rather well, wrote a superb piece that covers all the points I wanted to come out my mouth during a three-minute radio slot and a whole lot more. (Shameless ode to new media coming up …) Print media rarely has such comprehensive, measured and intelligent commentary. Instead, national newspapers fire out opinion in brief, emotive editorials, adopting a simplistic black-and-white approach that does nothing to encourage creative thought on issues like Tibet. (Blimey, I thought I was going to bang on about ”emancipation of the mind” for a minute there).

During my research into China’s propaganda strategies, I contacted the China Media Project’s David Bandurski, who made an interesting observation on the type of images screened on CCTV of the riots in Lhasa. Obviously, they focused on Tibetans attacking Chinese, survivors talking about their friends being killed and both Chinese and Tibetans lying injured on hospital beds. Powerful stuff and highly effective as propaganda tools when context is absent. Yet, they stopped short of allowing the more graphic shots such as cars being torched or overturned. According to David: “This is because party leaders do not want Chinese with different kind of grievances, like stolen farmland, to get any ideas.”

I also spoke to a Chinese friend of a friend, a marketing manager who studied for a year and a half in the UK, about what she thought of the government news shaping. Her answer was something I have heard many times before and I always find it a depressing opinion.

“I know the government cuts all the negative information and we can not see the true story. But it has to do this. Most Chinese are poor and not well educated. They are not capable of independent thought or making their own judgements. They need to be guided by the government.”

We could almost get back to “thought liberation” here …

Xinhua journalists are also well aware of the ugly nature of government propaganda and have wide-ranging access to foreign media reports. But I’m sure the majority are fully committed to their current work on Tibet. Behind all those ludicrous commentaries vilifying the Dalai Lama, stories of Tibetan grannies receiving birthday cake from the government and tales of genuine tragedy in which innocent Han Chinese civilians have died, are journalists trying to do a good job. “Xinhua is doing some good work on Tibet,” a former colleague told me the other day. In some respects he is right. In terms of information gathering and following the Ministry of Publicity directives, they are being highly efficient. Some are working until 4am to pump out stories onto the wire, others have been sent to Lhasa to bolster the story-hunting operation. But Dui Wai Bu journalists face a disheartening reality. While their colleagues in the Chinese-language department for domestic consumption believe in what they are writing and strike a chord with their audience, the English-language writers believe in what they writing and only succeed in turning the stomachs of their audience. Such is the rift between the effectiveness of the propaganda on the international front and at home.

The ultimate aim of the news output is to incite anger and resentment. But I’m sure the blood of many Xinhua journalists would have been boiling well before the first Xinhua story was released about Tibet. And it wasn’t just because of the presence of a particular image on the database: the charred shell of Xinhua’s Lhasa bureau, its doors ripped off their hinges (there’s a pic somwhere on ESWN). After all, the Ministry of Publicity had done what it does best and bumbled around for a few days after the riots broke out, unsure of what strategy to follow. This allowed the western media to get a headstart and convince Dui Wai Bu journalists of its deep-rooted bias. One major motivation behind the department’s work (and I do have a small amount of sympathy for this) is a perceived duty to protect China’s international image in the face of what is deemed one-sided, critical reporting from the whole of ”the West”. The fact that some of India’s newspapers can be the most biting is always overlooked for some reason.

I had an interesting conversation with one former colleague, who said he didn’t need the agency’s propaganda ouput to make him feel irate.

“We are angry not because of the news stories but because we can see the facts. It’s not just pictures from Xinhua. When I see photos from foreign news agencies, I also feel hatred towards the people who are carrying out the violence.

“Before the riots I was neutral towards the Dalai Lama, despite the government’s criticisms. I heard he was a calm, spiritual leader. But now I realise he is two-faced. He orchestrated the riots in Lhasa and all around the world. Premier Wen (Jiabao) said he had ample evidence to prove this. It is obvious. Why else did Tibetans all around the world start demonstrating?”

On a crude level, the Ministry of Publicity has done a good job.